L'histoire fournit de nombreux exemples qui montrent que l'innovation peut contribuer à améliorer le monde, mais qu'elle peut aussi causer énormément de tort. L'une des ironies de notre époque est que, alors que les économies sont de plus en plus axées sur les services, nous produisons, transportons et consommons plus que jamais, et grâce à des moyens toujours plus novateurs, des biens matériels qui exigent beaucoup de ressources et d'énergie. C'est là que les politiques publiques doivent jouer un rô le. L'innovation peut accroître le bien-être, mais uniquement dans des environnements sociopolitiques qui répondent à sa double nature. L'innovation est en général quelque chose de difficile à réaliser, mais accroître le bien-être grâce à l'innovation est encore plus difficile. Ainsi, pour les décideurs politiques, la question n'est pas simplement de favoriser l'innovation, mais de faire en sorte que les effets de cette innovation soient bénéfiques à la société. Dans cet article, j'explique qu'utiliser l'innovation comme stratégie pour réduire les menaces que subit l'environnement exigera donc que nous composions avec cette nécessité. La démocratie implique un large débat sur l'innovation, et, dans le cas du Canada, atteindre des objectifs de durabilité ne sera possible que si les institutions publiques sont de nouveau des agents d'innovation.
Innovation as Friend and Foe
It is unlikely that our rapidly mounting environmental challenges can be met without innovation of unprecedented scope on a global scale. However, innovation is not just going to ''fix'' the earth, any more than it is just going to ''fix'' unemployment or any other social ill. Innovation is also the origin of most of the social and environmental problems we seek to solve, and it can just as easily exacerbate them as eliminate them. History is replete with evidence that innovation can improve our lives in some circumstances and devastate them in others. It can destroy whole industries, economies, and civilizations just as easily as it can create them (Baumol 1990 ). This essential duality has been recognized explicitly since the very first attempts to explore innovation systematically as a social and economic phenomenon. It is what Schumpeter meant by his aphorism ''creative destruction,'' and it has remained at the heart of all subsequent theories of innovation-driven growth.
If global warming is anthropogenic in origin, then we must be prepared to consider that its relationship with innovation is more than coincidental and not automatically positive (Phillimore 2001) . In roughly the same period that accumulations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) have been escalating rapidly, industrial innovation in virtually all sectors has been accelerating far beyond any previously imaginable rate of increase. The irony of our times is that as our economies become more and more service driven, we are producing, transporting, and consuming more resource and energy-intensive material goods than ever before, and in ever more innovative ways.
And herein lies the motivation for policy. Innovation can increase welfare, but only within socio-political environments that can respond creatively to its dual nature. Innovating is usually very hard to do, but sustaining human welfare through innovation is always even harder. Thus, for policy makers, the point is not just to increase the incidence of innovation but also to use it to leverage positive social outcomes. In this essay, I will propose that deploying innovation as a strategy for mitigating threats to the environment will demand that we get to grips with it from this perspective. I will argue toward the conclusion that democracy is a public conversation about innovation and that in the Canadian case, achieving sustainability goals will be impossible unless public institutions are rehabilitated as agents of innovation.
Why Innovation Spells Trouble
Innovation is troublesome on two seemingly contradictory fronts. The first is that it is unpredictable. No particular alignment or quantity of inputs to innovation has ever been shown to yield any proportionate, not to mention predictable, outcome (Gault 2010; Godin 2006 ). The second is that innovation is also entirely predictable. Even if innovation cannot be reproduced to order, the phenomenon itself plays out in remarkably similar patterns or cycles within a definable system.
The unpredictable elements present formidable challenges for policy that tends to be highly linear in its thinking. But the predictable elements provide many opportunities for policy to induce socially positive outcomes. It is possible to predict how things will happen even if it is not possible to predict exactly what will happen. To understand why, we have to examine what lies behind innovation as an economic concept.
What Is Innovation-led Growth?
''Innovation'' is used commonly to refer to any kind of change, especially technological change. But innovation is also a theory of economic growth-or rather a complex of theories. The theory is often poorly understood, even among those who write frequently about the subject of innovation. And not everyone buys in to it; even its most avid proponents will acknowledge that enterprises do not always have to innovate to prosper. Schumpeter (1939) saw innovation in terms of entrepreneurship, whereby new enterprises were created around new products, processes, and sources of supply, or even from opening up new markets for existing goods. Followers framed this concept within the much narrower context of technical change (Freeman and Soete 1997) . Today it tends to be expressed even more narrowly in terms of how scientific discoveries and/ or technological inventions become commercialized (Mowery et al. 2004; Feller 1990) . In this context, innovation has become more of an organizational and management theory (Christensen 1997; Pavitt 1990) .
The economic theory of innovation is actually much broader. It is less concerned with how new factors of production appear than with the consequences for the economy as a whole of how new and existing factors are combined and recombined over time. Specifically, the theory proposes that growth is stimulated by nonroutine activities that keep markets and institutions in a state of disruption and evolution (Nelson and Winter 1982; Dosi et al. 1988) . When the theory was first worked out, technological asymmetries between countries and regions were extreme; by today's standards, technical change was relatively infrequent, although certainly impactful. Today, technical change has become virtually routine. Therefore, many scholars now question whether the dynamics of innovation are associated so exclusively with changes in technology, or with a host of other commercial, social, political, and cultural factors that also can be demonstrated, theoretically and empirically, to be significant for innovation (Stoneman 2010; Potts et al. 2008; McMeekin et al. 2002) .
In essence, the theory proposes that growth is the product not so much of what instigates or embodies the innovation but rather of the ensuing processes of adoption, adaptation and adjustment that are induced throughout the economy as a whole (Freeman 2008; Nelson, Peterhansl, and Sampat 2004; Nelson and Winter 1982) . This is what creates new imperatives to invest and stimulates diversification. Outputs of a qualitatively different nature appear that incorporate new knowledge and establish new learning routines (Dodgson 1993; Lundvall 1992) . In this framework, entrepreneurship is not about giving the market more of what it wants more efficiently, but about convincing the market that it wants something it never wanted before, or never even knew existed (Dew et al. 2011; Hawkins and Davis 2012) . That said, the process typically involves an intense and complex interaction between the forces of supply and demand (Potts et al. 2008; von Hippel 2005) .
However, the wrinkle in this scheme is that innovations never achieve maximum efficiency until they crowd out all other solutions. This can be a real problem, either because sub-optimal solutions are selected in the first place or because solutions become sub-optimal over time (David 1985) . Increasing returns from established learning routines can create lock-in (Cowan 1990; Arthur 1989 ). Thus, once ensconced, innovations can become very difficult to dislodge (Weiss and Bonvillian 2011) . Thus it is that petroleum, originally promoted as a medicine, became a radical innovation when it was transformed into a motor fuel. It achieved maximum efficiency by crowding out all other alternatives. Now it is one of the chief impediments to innovation that might reduce the environmental footprint of the automobile.
All of this illustrates that to some extent, all innovations become standards. Innovators incur huge amounts of up-front risk; they cannot survive unless they sustain revenue-producing capabilities long enough to pay back this investment and generate the increased profits that eventually we consider to be growth (Swann 2009; Blind 2004) . This is why the most serially successful innovating firms are also typically leaders in setting technical standards and in developing multipurpose service platforms, industry agreements, and regulations (Blind 2012; Hawkins 1999 ). But such incumbent stability also motivates entrepreneurs to disrupt and destabilize. And so the process is perpetuated.
Exactly how and when entrepreneurs will go about destabilizing existing markets, and their rate of success, is the unpredictable part of the innovation system. But all of the rest is remarkably predictable. Whether in the context of technology, organization, marketing, resource supply, process, policy, or social attitudes and cultural values, the process of innovation tends to follow much the same logic within much the same systems dynamic.
Is Innovation Only about Economic Growth?
Economic theories of innovation are basically theories of growth. Innovation creates value over and above what was there before, sustaining an economy by generating an ever-expanding spectrum of possible new factor combinations. To make room for them, it also supplants, marginalizes, redeploys or even eliminates existing sources of value. The key assumptions are that welfare is the outcome of growth and that innovations produce it to the extent that they generate enough additional value to replace and surpass any losses.
But innovation can apply also to economic theory. The whole concept of a growth economy is a social and political innovation of relatively recent origin; it is a product of new concepts, attitudes, rules, rights, and institutional structures. That it has become the global standard for how to organize human affairs should start us thinking about what sort of entrepreneurial endeavours might emerge to threaten it, and, reflecting the duality of innovation, whether this might be a good or bad idea.
It would be just as much an innovation to impose a new paradigm as it was to adopt the current one. In principle, if motivated differently, it is entirely possible that the same systems logic might produce a paradigm based, for example, on low, controlled or even no growth (cf. Victor 2008) . This is not to comment on the desirability of such outcomes but only to reiterate that by its nature the innovation system seldom delivers exactly what we expect. The limitation of most existing economic theories of innovation is that they are logically consistent only within the existing growth-dependent economic paradigm. Even if one applies them to new goals, such as sustainability, growth remains the primary objective of innovation.
The current assumption tends to be that we will ''grow'' into sustainability, ''greening'' becoming yet the latest form of factor substitution in basically the same growth model. We will stimulate growth by making the earth cleaner, so the arguments go (cf. Nordhaus and Schellenberger 2007) . But the logic of the innovation system might also generate more surprising outcomesentirely new ''rules for the village,'' which, I propose, ultimately constitute the route to avoiding environmental tragedy.
Innovating Our Way out of Environmental Catastrophe?
When one looks at the current arguments that underpin the concept of an innovation-led ''green'' economy, it is remarkable how similar they are to those put forward in the 1990s for a ''new'' economy. This should be salutary, because many of the current conceptual and practical problems with innovation policy that could thwart sustainability goals are mostly ideological artifacts of that era.
The new economy was the love child of microelectronics. Although mostly the invention of an enthusiastic business press, it inflected more than two decades of economic planning throughout the OECD and beyond. At the extremes, some proposed that because of the specific and putatively unprecedented characteristics of IT, economics now worked differently (cf. Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987) . Certainly theories of innovation appeared to be playing out in a singularly dynamic way: product-development time scales were truncated dramatically, companies emerged from out of nowhere and grew at astounding rates, and underdeveloped and/or stagnant economies appeared to bloom and boom overnight. Information technology appeared to generate unprecedentedly massive increasing returns to investment, leading to speculation that as long as investment gravitated to high-tech industries, the result might just be the long-sought moto perpetuum of constantly increasing production with full employment, high wages, and low inflation (OECD 2001) . Effectively, the vicissitudes of the business cycle would disappear.
Unsurprisingly, policy-makers were attracted to the new economy like bears to honey. The problem is that they remained so even after it had become clear that this was no magical new fountain of sustained prosperity (Baily 2002) . The impacts of microelectronics have been revolutionary, but they hardly broke the business cycle. The anticipated perpetual growth syndrome came to the first of several crashing halts well before the dawn of the new century. Moreover, the impacts varied greatly from industry to industry (Boyer 2004; Gordon 2000) . Direct impacts on productivity were substantial in specific cases, but relationships to overall sustained growth have remained stubbornly difficult to demonstrate (Pilat, Lee, and van Ark 2002) .
Most proponents of the green economy are perhaps not quite as extreme in their expectations, but their core reasoning that investing in new waves of green technology will induce the same increasing returns to investment is similar-and every bit as problematical.
Innovation and Public Policy
The Silicon Valley model of industrial organization proved to be very effective in the industry that spawned it. But policy-makers have assumed falsely ever since that it is the base model for innovation in all sectors and industries (Hughes 2008) . As a result, all OECD governments typically pursue innovation agendas aimed at promoting the success of new high-tech companies that they hope will grow into global giants, even though the probability of this result is extraordinarily remote (Cosh and Hughes 2010 and the actual productivity of small firms in this role is consistently overestimated or misstated (Shane 2009; Tether 2000) . At the same time, however, governments work even harder at maintaining the status quo for dominant incumbents in key industries (Weiss and Bonvillian 2011) . Thus, although mostly via shadowy provisions in the tax system, Canadian governments since the 1980s have made substantial wealth transfers to subsidize ''R&D,'' most of which flows to routine product development processes in large established industries (Industry Canada 2011). And as the policy has persisted, Canada's performance on all of the standard innovation indicators has turned steadily negative (CCA 2014 (CCA , 2013 (CCA , 2009 .
Governments likewise have pinned all innovation policies on new technology, simplistically assuming that if more of it gets invented then more innovation will be induced. But the relationship between R&D and innovation is highly problematic (Hawkins 2012) . In innovation surveys, many more companies report making innovations than ever report doing R&D (Arundel, Bordoy, and Kanerva 2008) . In Canada, about 50 percent of all R&D investment is performed by fewer than 100 companies, with less than one percent of all business establishments ever reporting an R&D investment (Gault 2010) . Such distributions are typical of most OECD countries. They do not indicate that R&D is unimportant, but they do indicate that it is but one feature in a much larger landscape, most of which remains chronically out of the view of Canadian policy-makers. The sorry result, especially it would seem on the environmental front, is that we get lots of invention, but little real innovation.
Canada's Innovation Dilemma
In the end, the R&D-led new economy became basically the nervous system for an increasingly resource-consumptive material economy. So how do we save greeneconomy initiatives from a similarly ignominious fate? Well, we innovate. Only we learn to do it in more intelligently systemic ways.
By far the most significant innovation in recent Canadian history is manufacturing oil from sand. This took nearly a century to accomplish and involved huge public as well as private investments (Chastko 2004) . As a sector, energy now accounts for about 20 percent of Canadian exports. Most of the real employment growth over the past two decades has been attributable to it. It has fomented a fundamental shift of political power from east to west, along with the most massive demographic shift since the construction of the continental railway. The currency is pegged to it. And, most importantly, if it all comes undone-as the recent crash in oil prices suggests it might-there is virtually no other currently available Canadian export that could substitute the lost value at any comparable level. Perfectly reflecting its dual nature, this innovation has created huge amounts of new wealth while at the same time leaving the economy distressingly exposed and vulnerable in many key respects. Impacts from innovation simply do not get any bigger than this.
This level of dependency on one innovation would be much more discomforting were it not for the fact that it also anchors one of Canada's largest knowledge clusters. Indeed, for the past three decades, the oil and gas sector has supported or motivated probably the largest single cluster of scientific and technological capabilities ever assembled in this country (ACR 2011) . With all such clusters, the potential is always significant to diversify the fields in which this knowledge is applied.
Unfortunately, the diversification narrative in Canada has been mostly to diversify markets for existing export commodities at current levels of value-added. No strategy has yet been articulated for diversifying the content of these exports. The last published government document merely describes a random collection of institutions and measures, as one would see in virtually every OECD jurisdiction, but with no clearly articulated sense of how it could be mobilized to induce change in key Canadian industries (Industry Canada 2014). In the sustainability context, the challenge is how to induce an existing industry to evolve from being mainly an environmental problem to being part of potentially a huge variety of solutions. The knowledge and experience gained from innovations like the oil sands also place Canada in a unique position to refine, adapt, adopt, and export such solutions in the form of products and services.
The real danger is that entrepreneurs in other jurisdictions will reap the benefits of our knowledge investments, as currently they do in most other sectors. At the moment, potential major providers of solutions to serious global problems such as water management, air quality, GHG control and mitigation, and a host of other issues that are endemic to non-conventional fossil fuels look more likely to emerge in the United States, Europe or even China than in Canada. So how to break out of this impasse?
Changing the Rules
Canadian governments are fond of proclaiming that responsibility for innovation belongs with business, not government, and that governments should not engage in picking winners. But in terms of understanding the role of policy in innovation, this doctrine is seriously diversionary in three important respects.
First, government is by far the largest single customer for all goods and services, thus inevitably exerting an enormous sway over which markets appear and disappear (Edler and Georghiou 2007) . Second, and aside from any actions aimed specifically at business and industry, governments make and enforce a huge complex of rules that affect the conduct of everyday life, any of which can have huge effects on whether or not innovations happen and on their impacts. Third, governments make exclusive public investments in knowledge and skills, which encompass the whole range of human knowledge and form the life blood of innovation (Hawkins, Langford, and Saunders 2015; Hughes 2011; Fini, Lacetera, and Shane 2010) .
Moreover, there is compelling historical evidence that, on the whole, governments have rather good records at picking winners. Silicon Valley is a good example, having been created mostly by US government grants, subsidies, and contracts. Indeed, the normal pattern in most new knowledge-intensive industries has been for governments to invest first and for industry to come on board once the early risks have been absorbed (Mazzucatto 2013) . The problem for government has never been winner-picking but rather loser-picking-the inevitable result of failing to engage creatively and productively in promoting innovation.
Policies in Canada have been predicated for too long on the dubious notion that the problem is how to increase the quantity of invention. Accordingly, they focus mainly on upstream activities: support schemes for small entrepreneurs, R&D tax credits, technology transfer schemes, and so on. These measures are aimed almost exclusively at the most unpredictable and intractable end of the innovation spectrum. Their record of success ranges from marginal to abysmal.
Ignored is the demonstrably more productive scope to intervene in the predictable parts of the process. In this context, governments mostly do the kinds of things they are uniquely charged to do anyway, except in ways that could promote innovation and harness its outcomes to the public good. Actions in areas such as public procurement, market aggregation, skills strategies, international treaties, consumer and competition legislation, and generally in rule making through legislation and regulation, all have been demonstrated to have huge effects on the occurrence and impacts of innovation. Governments can be entrepreneurial in their own right without straying very far from their normal responsibilities. This is how the predictability of the innovation system can be leveraged both to encourage change and to mitigate unintended effects. That Canadian governments have abandoned this strategy is purely an ideological artifact, based in tired political mythologies about relationships between public and private sectors. But most OECD countries do embrace it, and certainly Canada should start joining their ranks.
Innovation becomes significant when good ideas are gathered and/or assimilated into substantial industrial structures that have the power to shape existing markets and to create new ones. Very rarely does this happen through the growth of individual small enterprises, even though they may be crucial sources of new ideas. But it happens all the time when governments provide incentives and/or imperatives for existing industries to do things differently, and for aggregating emerging S50 Hawkins capabilities. In this way, markets are created for new ideas from all sources. Clusters form, and eventually whole new industries emerge. If innovation is to be made to work for Canada, and to contribute to a greener future, the current policy focus on the unpredictable upstream elements must be counterbalanced with more attention to how this might affect established incumbents, especially where they have become impediments to innovation.
Canada's Innovation Future
This activist approach is by no means new in Canada. To the contrary, every one of our backbone knowledgeintensive industries has been created in this way (Niosi 1990 ). The synthetic oil industry itself is the epitome of this approach. The problem is that most Canadian policymakers have not thought in this way since the 1970s, the oil sands being the one notable exception.
Innovation is not about steering a safe, defined course but about finding a new course, and accepting its risks. In this respect, democracy is very much a conversation about innovation. It is a fundamental public debate both about how a society will change and about how it will accommodate change imposed on it from outside. Our challenge in Canada is to articulate policy agendas that keep us focused on seizing opportunities to transform what we actually have in hand. Prior to the change of government following the 2015 election, the federal government's stance on sustainability and the environment had been either to deny the problem or to make misleading or bogus claims that it was being addressed in policy. This approach diluted confidence, domestically and internationally, in our ability and commitment to transform into innovative solutions the very environmental threats to which we have contributed by fulfilling world demands for energy.
The new government has adopted exactly the opposite approach of admitting the problem and even pegging much of Canada's economic future on building up ''green'' industry. At the moment, however, there are at best mixed signs that their thinking on the innovation policy front goes much beyond the more extensive application of current orthodoxies. Canada is one of only a handful of countries fortunate enough to be both a knowledge-based and a resource-based economy. This means that we are in the best position to develop unique solutions to the environmental problems created by resource extraction and use. It would be a tragedy if the new policy apparatus were to become as incapable as the one it replaced of articulating a strategy to realize this advantage. Most federal policy over the past couple of decades has cut Canada off from probably the most secure avenue for long-term economic and environmental sustainability through innovation. Changing this will be an immensely more difficult problem than coming up with new technology.
